The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

August 2017

Human Capital as Intellectual Property? NonCompetes and the Limits of IP Protection
Viva R. Moffat

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Moffat, Viva R. (2017) "Human Capital as Intellectual Property? Non-Competes and the Limits of IP Protection,"
Akron Law Review: Vol. 50 : Iss. 4 , Article 7.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss4/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Moffat: Human Capital as Intellectual Property?

HUMAN CAPITAL AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY?
NON-COMPETES AND THE LIMITS OF IP PROTECTION
Viva R. Moffat ∗

Introduction ................................................................................. 903
I.
Background ........................................................................ 909
II.
The Logical Extension of the IP Justification for NonCompetes ........................................................................... 912
A. Is Human Capital Like Other Forms of IP? ................ 913
B. The Utilitarian Approach: Do We Need to Provide
an Incentive for the Creation of or Investment in
Human Capital? .......................................................... 914
C. Defining the Scope of the Subject Matter ................... 917
D. What Rights are Included? .......................................... 921
E. Who Owns the Rights and How May They be
Conveyed?................................................................... 924
F. How Long Does Protection Last? ............................... 925
G. Are There Boundary Principles? How do the
Different Forms of IP Relate to Each Other?.............. 926
III. Conclusion ......................................................................... 928
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade or so, employers in the United States have
dramatically increased the use of employee noncompetition agreements,
seeking to limit the types and scope of employment in which workers
can engage after leaving a job. “The growth of noncompete agreements
is part of a broad shift in which companies assert ownership over work
∗ Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, University of Denver Sturm College
of Law. The author thanks Akron School of Law for the invitation to participate in the IP Scholars
Forum in September 2016; the participants in the Forum for their suggestions and contributions and
lively discussion; and the editors of the Akron Law Review for their valuable comments and for
their time and efforts.
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experience as well as work.” 1 This is true not only for high-level
employees in knowledge-intensive industries, but also for employees in
a huge range of other commercial enterprises, including many low-wage
workers in service industry jobs. 2 A recent White House report cited
research finding that eighteen percent of American workers report being
currently bound by a non-compete, and thirty-seven percent indicate that
they have at some point in their working lives signed such an
agreement. 3 The New York Times reports that 30 million Americans “are
hobbled by so-called non-compete agreements, fine print in their
employment contracts that keeps them from working for corporate rivals
in their next job.” 4 Employers also appear to have stepped up
enforcement of noncompetition agreements. According to one study,
there was a sixty-one percent increase in post-employment
noncompetition lawsuits between 2002 and 2013. 5 There is almost
certainly widespread use of non-competes and pre-litigation enforcement
that goes on under the radar, so these numbers likely undercount the
prevalence of non-compete agreements.
As the use and enforcement of non-competes has increased, so has
the attention of the courts and legislatures to these agreements. In the
last several years, there have been a number of significant state supreme
court cases regarding non-competes, and a variety of new and amended

1. Conor Dougherty, How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, N.Y. TIMES (May
13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/noncompete-clauses.html?_r=0.
2. For example, Jimmy John’s took a great deal of heat when it was revealed that it required
all employees to sign a non-compete clause. See, e.g., Dave Jamieson, Jimmy John’s Makes LowWage Workers Sign ‘Oppressive’ Noncompete Agreements, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/13/jimmy-johns-noncompete_n_5978180.html?1413230622. See Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly
Pop Up in Array of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/
2014/06/09/business/noncompete-clauses-increasingly-pop-up-in-array-of-jobs.html (“Noncompete
clauses are now appearing in far-ranging fields beyond the worlds of technology, sales and
corporations with tightly held secrets, where the curbs have traditionally been used. From event
planners to chefs to investment fund managers to yoga instructors, employees are increasingly
required to sign agreements that prohibit them from working for a company’s rivals”).
3. Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of the Usage, Potential Issues, and State Responses,
White
House
Report,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/noncompetes_report_final2.pdf, at 3 [hereinafter White House Report].
4. Steve Lohr, To Compete Better, States Are Trying to Curb Noncompete Pacts, N.Y.
TIMES (June 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/technology/to-compete-better-statesare-trying-to-curb-noncompete-pacts.html.
5. White House Report, supra note 4, at 3, citing Beck Reed Riden study. See also Ruth
Simon & Angus Loten, Litigation Over Noncompete Clauses is Rising, WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Aug.
15,
2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887323446404579011501388418552.
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statutes passed by state legislatures. 6 For the most part, the judicial and
legislative responses to the use and enforcement of non-compete
agreements have focused on restricting or limiting the use of those
agreements in various ways. 7 The White House and the Treasury
Department reports also indicate a great deal of skepticism regarding the
utility and propriety of non-competes. The Obama administration issued
a “State Call to Action on Non-Compete Agreements,” in which it called
for substantial restrictions on non-competes: “Most workers should not
be covered by a non-compete agreement. Though each state faces
different circumstances, we believe that employers have more targeted
means to protect their interests, that non-compete agreements should be
the exception rather than the rule, and that there is gross overuse of noncompete clauses today.” 8
The concerns about non-compete agreements revolve around, first,
the effect of the agreements on the economy and on innovation, and,
second, the implications for workers and mobility in the labor market.
The Treasury Department report, for example, states that while there are
likely benefits that flow from non-compete enforcement, those “benefits
come at the expense of workers and the broader economy.” 9 The White
House report, drawing on the Treasury Department study, also points to
serious concerns about non-compete use and enforcement. The report:
provides a starting place for further investigation of the problematic
usage of one institutional factor that has the potential to hold back
wages—non-compete agreements. These agreements currently impact
nearly a fifth of U.S. workers, including a large number of low-wage
workers. This brief delineates issues regarding misuse of non-compete
agreements and describes a sampling of state laws and legislation to
address the potentially high costs of unnecessary non-competes to
workers and the economy. 10

6. See Lohr, supra note 5 (discussing legislative changes and efforts in Massachusetts,
Hawaii, New Mexico, Oregon, and Utah).
7. See, e.g., Conn. S.B. 00351 (restricting non-competes for physicians); Ill. S.B. 3163
(“Freedom to Work” Act prohibiting non-competes for low-wage workers); Utah H.B. 0251
(limiting non-competes to one year).
8. State Call to Action on Non-Compete Agreements, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/ competition/ noncompetes-calltoaction-final.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
9. RYAN NUNN, OFFICE OF ECONOMIC POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
NON-COMPETE CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3 (2016), available at
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/UST%20Noncompetes%20Report.pdf.
10. White House Report, supra note 4, at 2.
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Indeed, there has been a great deal of legislative and judicial
attention paid to non-compete agreements. It is not only the White
House and academics, but also courts and legislators that are skeptical of
the agreements. Non-competes are void as a matter of public policy in
three states, 11 and virtually all of the new legislation and common law
development has resulted in increasing restrictions on the use of the
agreements. 12 Moreover, the general approach in the states in which the
agreements are enforceable is a cautious one: non-competes are subject
to a reasonableness or balancing test in nearly all jurisdictions.13
This deep skepticism is remarkable, given the general approach that
American law takes to contract formation and enforcement: “freedom of
contract” generally means that courts will not look into the terms of an
agreement or the adequacy of exchange.14 But with respect to noncompete agreements, every state requires such an examination, 15 except
where the agreements are flatly prohibited. 16 In the jurisdictions that
prohibit non-competes entirely, the justification is generally that the free
flow of labor is more important than whatever interests weigh in favor of
non-compete enforcement: protection of business interests, a need to
protect trade secrets, etc. 17 And even in the states in which non-competes
are permissible under some circumstances the concern for the free flow
of labor is significant. In both cases, the skepticism of the law toward
non-competition echoes concerns regarding the master-servant
11. Most notably, California bans non-compete agreements. Cal. Business & Professions
Code § 16600.
12. See Lohr, supra note 5; see also infra page 33-34, Recent Legislative Action.
13. See Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 943
(2012) (noting that while there are a variety of approaches to non-competes, many states scrutinize
the agreements closely and that “not a single state takes a pure private ordering approach . . .”).
14. There are exceptions, of course. In a few other areas, courts are much more likely to look
into the nature and terms of the agreement or the process by which agreement was reached. For
example, prenuptial agreements receive additional scrutiny, and in the real property context,
landlord-tenant agreements. Both of these examples are notable, in that they involve both situations
of asymmetrical bargaining (potentially) and a set of dignitary interests that justify treating the
agreements as something other than, or in addition to, basic elements of free market exchange.
15. See Moffat, supra note 14, at 947. For a comprehensive survey, see Beck Reed Riden
LLP, Employee Noncompetes, A State by State Survey, http://www.beckreedriden.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/noncompetes-50-state-survey-chart-20170204.pdf (last visited Mar. 17,
2017).
16. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600. See also North Dakota Non-Compete Law Shares
History with California, JACKSONLEWIS.COM, http://www.noncompetereport.com/2013/01/northdakota-non-compete-law-shares-history-with-california/. The restrictions in California and North
Dakota flow from their adoption of the Field Code in the middle of the nineteenth century.
17. Omri Ben-Shahar, California Got It Right: Ban The Non-Compete Agreements, FORBES
(Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/omribenshahar/2016/10/27/california-got-it-rightban-the-non-compete-agreements/#487b8e1c3538.
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relationship and the history of indentured servitude. 18
With this history in mind, it is no surprise that employee noncompete agreements are treated differently from other kinds of contracts.
The subject matter of non-competes is people—human beings—and the
goal of those agreements is to control that human capital. This history is
important, both because it goes some way to explaining the current
posture of the law toward non-compete agreements, and because it helps
frame the conversation in a way that takes account of factors other than
employers’ justifications and arguments in favor of non-compete
agreements.
It is important to understand the employers’ arguments, however.
The majority of the discussion regarding non-competes focuses on
efficiency and utilitarian arguments, but until a dispute reaches
litigation, employers need not provide any sort of justification for asking
employees to sign the agreements. When employers do explain their
motivations, the reasons often sound like the justifications for
intellectual property protection. 19 Sometimes this is explicit: employers
will indicate that they need non-competes as an additional protection
against trade secret theft, as a sort of meta-IP protection. 20 In other
situations, the IP justification is more implicit: employers will assert that
the agreements are necessary to protect their investment of resources and
training in an employee or because that is what is required for employers
to disclose confidential or trade secret information to employees. This is
a classic IP justification—some form of right or form of protection is
necessary in order to provide a sufficient incentive for the creation and
dissemination of valuable intangible goods. 21
In any event, the effect of non-compete agreements is to treat
human capital as a form of intellectual property: with non-competes,
human capital becomes an intangible but alienable form of property,
exchanged—albeit in a limited way—for valuable consideration. 22
18. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960)
(citing Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711), for its discussion of and concerns about
restraints being imposed on apprentices by their masters).
19. Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with Noncompetition
Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 899-904 (2010).
20. See White House Report, supra note 4, at 4. The report states at the outset that “[t]he
main economically and societally beneficial uses of non-competes are to protect trade secrets, which
can promote innovation, and to incentivize employers to invest in worker training because of
reduced probability of exit from the firm.”
21. In many situations, the reasons go unstated, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
in some cases the agreements are nothing more than anti-competitive restraints on trade.
22. There are many instances in which the employer provides nothing more than continued
employment in exchange for the employee’s forbearance from certain kinds of future employment.
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Taking the IP approach means thinking about the utilitarian notions that
typically underlie the grant of IP rights under United States law and
considering them in the context of human capital. It further means
clarifying the terms on which we might consider treating human capital
as IP: what is the subject matter of the intellectual property right? Who
owns it, and how may it be transferred? What defenses exist? What are
the boundaries of this form of IP, and how does it relate to and interact
with other forms of intellectual property?
Even a brief foray into this territory reveals that the intellectual
property paradigm is an uncomfortable one, at best. Perhaps
surprisingly, it is the IP analysis that surfaces the dignitary concerns.
When one thinks carefully about whether human capital should be
considered a form of intellectual property, the personal autonomy and
dignitary implications rise to the forefront. Likewise, non-competes,
when used as tools for protecting intellectual property-like things, should
also be considered in IP terms. 23
In this article, I first provide a brief background on the ways that
non-compete agreements are used by U.S. employers and the
justifications that are often used for the imposition and enforcement of
the agreements, as well as an overview of the current academic and
policy debates concerning non-competes. In the second part, I turn to a
discussion of human capital as intellectual property, taking seriously this
justification for non-competes and seeking to approach human capital in
the same terms that we would evaluate other forms of intellectual
property. This thought experiment makes clear that human capital does
not fit well within the intellectual property paradigm. This should tip the
scale in terms of non-compete enforceability and, at a minimum, means
that the agreements should be enforceable only on grounds unrelated to
the intellectual property justification.

Some states have moved to require something more in the way of consideration, see, e.g., Lucht’s
Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Horner, 255 P.3d 1058 (Colo. 2011) and Std. Register Co. v. Keala, No.
14-00291 JMS-RLP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73695 (D. Haw. June 8, 2015), and this is yet another
example of the ways in the which non-competes are treated differently than other contracts, in
which a “peppercorn” of consideration is sufficient and neither courts nor legislatures would inquire
into the adequacy of consideration.
23. I explored this notion in a previous article, arguing that non-competition agreements are
not a good method of protecting intellectual property items. They are, at the same time, both underand over-broad, and they impose a variety of negative externalities. See Moffat, Wrong Tool, supra
note 20, at 911-20.
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I. BACKGROUND
As the recent White House and Treasury Department reports detail,
the use and enforcement of non-compete agreements is becoming more
widespread in not only the knowledge-intensive industries where we
might expect to find them, but also in a variety of contexts we would not
expect, such as low-wage service jobs. 24
A notable example in the service industry context arose when it was
revealed that Jimmy John’s, the sandwich shop chain, included a noncompete clause in every one of its employment agreements. Each
employee, in accepting the job, was prohibited for two years following
the end of employment with Jimmy John’s from working at any other
business that sold “submarine, hero-type, deli-style, pita, and/or wrapped
or rolled sandwiches” within two miles of any Jimmy John’s location. 25
Jimmy John’s has approximately 2,400 locations in forty-six states, and
the non-compete agreement thus meant as a practical matter that a
former Jimmy John’s employee might have a very difficult time finding
similar employment upon leaving Jimmy John’s. 26 When this provision
came to light, there was a great deal of publicity, an investigation by the
Illinois attorney general, and lawsuits. Jimmy John’s eventually settled
the suits and eliminated the non-compete provision from its employment
agreements, but this was not an isolated example. 27
It is not just particular industries or specific geographic areas in
which non-compete agreements have proliferated. They are omnipresent
in the high-tech world, and appear in agreements in a range of fields,
from mechanics to computer programmers, from hair stylists to
doctors. 28
As the use of non-competes has gone up, more attention has been
paid to non-competes in the last five or ten years. Scholars have debated
the effects of the agreements on the economy and on the rate of
innovation, as well as the implications for workers and the labor
market. 29 Legislatures have proposed and passed a wide range of bills,
24.
25.

See White House Report, supra note 4, at 3; see also NUNN, supra note 10, at 19 n.35.
Jimmy John’s Will Stop Making Low-Wage Employees Sign Non-Compete Agreements,
REUTERS (Jun. 22, 2016) http://fortune.com/2016/06/22/jimmy-johns-non-compete-agreements/.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Notably, they are virtual absent for lawyers. It is worth considering whether courts and
lawyers would think of non-competes differently if they were regularly subject to them.
29. See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Covenants-Not-to-Compete as the Legal
Infrastructure for Innovation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 251 (2015); Rachel S. Arnow-Richman,
Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: the Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power Via
Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963; Matthew Marx, Jasjit Singh & Lee
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most of them aimed at restricting the use of non-compete agreements. 30
And, finally, the courts have been active as well, regularly considering
challenges to non-compete agreements and in many cases, as with the
legislatures, limiting the use or enforcement of non-compete
agreements. 31
Scholars from the law and business worlds have recently focused
attention on non-competes, with the bulk of the discussion revolving
around the effects of non-competes on the markets—the economic
ecosystem, the labor market, and the rates of innovation and growth.
Since Annemarie Saxenian 32 and Ronald Gilson 33 kicked off a
discussion about the effects of non-compete enforcement, and argued
that California’s ban on non-compete agreements gave it a “regional
advantage” in attracting talent and producing growth because of the
labor mobility and spillover of talent, a variety of scholars from multiple
disciplines have continued to debate the question of the relative merits of
non-competes.
Professor Lobel, in her book Talent Wants to Be Free, picked up on
Gilson’s and Saxenian’s arguments, contending that increased labor
mobility is a net benefit to workers, to firms, and to the economy. 34 This
account has not gone uncontested, however. For example, Ted
Sichelman and Jonathan Barnett take a new look at the data and argue
that non-compete enforcement, or the lack thereof, is not nearly as
significant a factor as Lobel, Saxenian, and Gilson contend. 35 In their
article, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation Markets, Barnett and
Fleming, Regional Disadvantage? Employee Non-compete Agreements and Brain Drain, 44
RESEARCH POLICY, no. 2, 394-404 (2015); On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth
Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833 (2013); Matt Marx, Good Work If You
Can Get It . . . Again: Non-Compete Agreements, “Occupational Detours,” and Attainment 16
(Mass. Inst. Tech. Working Paper, 2009) [hereinafter Marx, Good Work], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456748.
30. See supra note 8.
31. See, e.g., Durrell v. Tech Elecs., Inc., 2016 WL 6696070 (E.D. Mo. 2016) (holding that
continuation of at-will employment not sufficient consideration for enforcing non-compete
agreement); Robinson v. U-Haul Company of California, 4 Cal. App. 5th 304 (2016) (affirming the
public policy interest of the state of California in not enforcing non-competes).
32. ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON
VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, (Harv. Univ. Press 1996).
33. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
34. ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS,
RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING, (Yale Univ. Press 2013).
35. Jonathan Barnett & Ted Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation Markets
(USC CLASS Research Paper No. 16-13; USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 16-15, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2758854. See also Gomulkiewicz, supra note
30.
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Sichelman conclude that
[t]here is little to no persuasive support for any causal relationship between banning noncompetes, on the one hand, and increasing employee turnover and innovation, on the other hand. Although restrictive
policies may further normative aims such as personal autonomy and
distributive fairness, there is currently no compelling reasons from an
efficiency perspective – the perspective primarily adopted by proponents of noncompete bans – to impose a flat ban on noncompetes and
other contractual limitations on employee mobility. 36

Barnett and Sichelman note at the outset of their study that “[t]he
conventional view of noncompetes rests on the efficiency rationale that
drives all IP rights: without some period of exclusivity, a firm has
difficulty earning returns on the investment in its human capital
assets.” 37 It is an underlying assumption of much of the literature that
non-competes are a form of intellectual property protection and, thus,
that human capital is an IP asset. Barnett and Sichelman acknowledge
this: “Just like IP rights, however, there is a tradeoff. Noncompetes may
also preclude otherwise efficient employment relationships and, over
time, diminish innovation by impeding the circulation of intellectual
capital (as well as raise personal autonomy concerns).”38 While the
discussion of the efficiency implications is quite robust in the literature,
the personal autonomy and dignitary concerns are often treated in this
parenthetical fashion. 39
Interestingly, it is when the IP rationale for non-competes is taken
seriouslyand taken to its logical conclusionthat the personal
autonomy concerns rise to the surface. And when they are clarified in
this way, the enforceability of non-compete agreements is deeply
troubling. Moreover, it almost goes without saying that the efficiency
and utilitarian arguments are not even deployed in discussions about
non-competes that are directed at low-wage workers and in low-IP
industries. 40 In those cases, the personal autonomy and dignitary
concerns, as well as the straightforward economic interests of the
36. Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 36, at 5.
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id.
39. To be fair, Barnett and Sichelman do not claim to be taking account of these issues, and
their conclusion is directed only to the efficiency rationales put forth regarding non-compete
enforcement. “In short, from an efficiency perspective, current evidence provides little compelling
support for abandoning the traditional measured approach toward enforcing non-competes and other
contractual limitations on employee mobility in innovation markets.” Id. at 54.
40. There is virtually no defense of non-compete enforcement in the context of low-wage
workers in either the scholarly literature or the policy discussions.
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workers, should take precedence.
II. THE LOGICAL EXTENSION OF THE IP JUSTIFICATION FOR NONCOMPETES
Employers, scholars, judges, and others seem to take it as a given
that non-competes function as a form of IP protection. 41 This premise is
rarely explored, however, nor is the corollary that human capital is being
treated as a new form of intellectual property. When attention has been
paid to the IP rationale, the focus is on the efficiency aspect of noncompetes: does non-compete enforcement help or hinder economic
development? Is there more innovation in states where non-competes are
disfavored or prohibited? What knowledge spillovers result from
increased employee mobility? 42
These are important questions, to be sure, but concerns regarding
personal autonomy and dignitary interests are not often explored. 43
Perhaps surprisingly, by thinking through the IP justification carefully,
this set of concerns rises to the surface and becomes more troubling. Put
another way, when human capital is considered a form of intellectual
property, the IP paradigm begins to seem inapt.
To be clear, the subject of non-compete agreements is human
capital, and to take the efficiency and utilitarian arguments at face value
is to say that human capital is a form of intellectual property. The logical
extension of treating human capital as a form of intellectual property and
of justifying non-competes as an appropriate form of protection for that
IP is to evaluate those arguments in IP terms. In other words, if noncompetes are justified on an IP theory they should be held to the
standards employed there. This means thinking about the policies that
animate patent law, copyright law, and trade secret law and about the
doctrines that define the subject matter of the IP at issue, the rights
attendant to that subject matter, the defenses that cabin those rights, and
the ways in which the IP regimes relate to each other. 44
If human capital is a form of intellectual property, a series of
41. See Moffat, Wrong Tool, supra note 20, at 898.
42. See generally Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 36, at 5.
43. See, e.g., Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 36, at 5 (“Although restrictive policies may
further normative aims such as personal autonomy and distributive fairness, there is currently no
compelling reason from an efficiency perspective—the perspective primarily adopted by proponents
of noncompete bans—to impose a flat ban on noncompetes and other contractual limitations on
employee mobility.”).
44. The analogy to trademark law is not as apt because of its primary focus on consumer
interests rather than property-like controls, and also because employers do not tend to make
arguments related to trademark-like concerns when they discuss and enforce non-competes.
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questions follows: does human capital have the characteristics usually
associated with other forms of IP? Do we need some sort of exclusive
right to ensure sufficient investment in or creation of human capital?
What is the subject matter of the thing being protected and what rights
accompany ownership? Who owns it initially? How may it be
transferred? How long do the rights last? What defenses exist? What are
the boundary principles and how does this form of protection interact
with other forms of IP protection?
In this section I walk through these questions as a kind of thought
experiment, and that thought experiment reveals that IP is not a good
paradigm for human capital and thus that the law’s skepticism regarding
non-competes is justified and should, in fact, go further.
A.

Is Human Capital Like Other Forms of IP?

Intellectual property differs in significant ways from real property,
and those differences explain many of the statutory and doctrinal
distinctions between the two forms. 45 Most obviously, intellectual
property is intangible, rather than tangible. In many instances, this
makes intellectual property a public good: a thing for which the benefits
are diffuse and inure to all, but for which the costs of creation are both
high and difficult to spread across society. 46 It is not only intellectual
property that is considered a public good: lighthouses and national
defense are two of the standard examples of public goods. 47 Intellectual
property is deemed to provide a public benefit—in the increased
availability of life-saving medicines, for example, or the publication of
culture-enhancing novels and musical compositions. Those items are
thought to benefit society generally, but the costs of creating and
developing such things are focused on the creators. This is because of
two characteristics of intellectual property (and public goods generally):

45. See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 1 (Aspen 6th ed.) (discussing the
differences between real property and intellectual property and the resulting differences in legal
treatment).
46. See id. at 13:
(Economists generally offer lighthouses and national defense as examples of public
goods, since it is virtually impossible to provide the benefits of either one only to paying
clients. It is impossible, for example, to exclude some ships and not others from the benefits of a lighthouse. Further, the use of the lighthouse by one ship does not deplete the
value of its hazard warning to others. . . . For these reasons, the market will in theory undersupply such goods because producers cannot reap the marginal (incremental) value of
their investment in providing them).
47. Id.
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it is non-exclusive and non-rivalrous. 48 IP is non-exclusive because once
it is out in the world, access to it is difficult to control, and non-rivalrous
because one person’s use and enjoyment of it does not diminish the use
or enjoyment of others.
All of this is to say that public goods are just that“public” in
some fundamental waybut in the absence of some form of incentive or
other form of support or protection, there is unlikely to be sufficient
incentive to create and disseminate such things. We have addressed this
problem in some cases by having a government provide the public good,
as in the case of lighthouses and national defense. With intellectual
property, we have addressed the issue not by funding IP creation through
the government (although that happens to some extent in a variety of
industries—scientific research and arts grants, for example) but by
allowing for a private exclusive right to control the intellectual property,
analogous—but not identical—to a real property interest. 49
A threshold question, then, is whether we should think of human
capital as a public good. This presents immediate problems. Human
capital is a valuable resource that benefits society, certainly, but it is
both rivalrous and exclusive: rivalrous because it cannot be exploited by
an unlimited number of people, and exclusive because it is located in an
individual rather than a thing, tangible or intangible. A person’s talents
and efforts can, of course, inure to the benefit of many, but it is the
output—the results—of those talents and effort that are more easily
conceived of as a public good, not the person herself. 50
Even at this threshold stage of the inquiry, then, thinking of human
capital as a form of IPanalogous to a new song or a groundbreaking
drugpresents awkward questions. It is one thing to talk about
lighthouses or new cancer mediations as public goods, but it is difficult
to find the language to think about human capital in those terms, even if
there are ways in which human capital shares some of the characteristics
of a public good.
B.

The Utilitarian Approach: Do We Need to Provide an Incentive for
the Creation of or Investment in Human Capital?
IP protection in the United States is based on an efficiency or

48. Id. at 2.
49. Id. at 13 (“ . . . government has created intellectual property rights in an effort to give
authors and inventors control over the use and distribution of their ideas, thereby encouraging them
to invest in the production of new ideas and works of authorship”).
50. See Moffat, Wrong Tool, supra note 20, at 914 n.160 (citing Marx, Good Work, supra
note 30).
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utilitarian rationale. 51 Though the framers of the Constitution disliked
the notion of monopoly, it was deemed necessary to provide some sort
of exclusive right for “writings” and “discoveries” because of their
public goods characteristics. 52 The concern was—and is—that in the
absence of some form of protection or incentive (or direct funding), a
sufficient level of public goods is unlikely to be produced. Patent law,
copyright law, and trade secret law are all premised upon the
consequences of this utilitarian notion: we justify the provision of some
form of exclusive rights in order to incentivize a sufficient level of
invention, creation, investment, and dissemination. And, in theory at
least, those rights are not justified if they do not create such an incentive.
In patent law and copyright law, this notion is enshrined in the
Constitution. Article I, section 8 sets forth the powers of Congress, and
clause 8 is the only one of those grants of power that contains prefatory
language. Congress may “secure exclusive” rights to authors and
inventors, but the provision indicates that it is in order “to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 53 This is widely understood to
require some degree of justification of copyright and patent rights on an
incentive theory: if the proposed legislation provides exclusive rights but
does not in any way “promote the progress of science and useful arts,”
Congress ought not have the authority to enact such legislation.
Since 1879, when the Supreme Court struck down trademark
legislation that was premised on the intellectual property clause, 54 the
Court has not rejected legislation on these grounds. The Court has,
however, considered challenges to copyright and patent legislation and
indicated that the “Progress” clause does indeed provide some limitation
on congressional authority. 55 Trade secret law, although not based upon

51. See Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 46, at 11 (“Utilitarian theory, and the
economic framework built upon it, has long provided the dominant paradigm for analyzing and
justifying the various forms of intellectual property protection.”).
52. Id. at 12.
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8.
54. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
If the symbol, however plain, simple, old, or well known, has been first appropriated by
the claimant as his distinctive trademark, he may by registration secure the right to its
exclusive use. While such legislation may be a judicious aid to the common law on the
subject of trademarks, and may be within the competency of legislatures whose general
powers embrace that class of subjects, we are unable to see any such power in the constitutional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and discoveries).
Id.
55. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012)
(holding that the clause contemplates incentives for dissemination of creative works, in addition to
incentives for the creation of those works).
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the constitutional grant of rights to Congress, and until recently solely
the province of state law, 56 is also animated by notions of utilitarianism
and incentive theory, among other justifications. 57
In considering human capital as a form of IP, then, one must pose
the question of whether providing some kind of right in human capital
would create an incentive for the creation and dissemination of, or
investment in, human capital. Even that simple statement is jarring: the
notion of providing an exclusive right in human capital (other than to the
individual in question) creates echoes of indentured servitude, even
slavery. Non-competes are not tantamount to servitude, of course, but
the law’s skepticism of the agreements derives in part from this
history. 58
Employers regularly assert the “need” for non-compete agreements,
often based on some version of an incentive or utilitarian theory. An
employer might argue that a non-compete agreement would provide an
incentive for investment in the training and education of an employee,
and that it would also encourage the employer to entrust the employee
with sensitive and confidential information such that the employee
would be better positioned to create value for the employer. 59 So there is
a plausible incentive story to be told with respect to non-compete
agreements, 60 but that does not make the employee-side arguments about
the detriments of non-competes less compelling. Just as Congress and
the courts have been hesitant to confer exclusive rights in other forms of
IP without a showing of a public benefit, such as the increased creation
and dissemination of useful or expressive works, we ought to examine
the proffered justifications for the use of non-competes. Thus far, the
efficiency arguments have received vastly more attention, from
proponents and opponents of non-competes alike, than have arguments
regarding personal autonomy. 61

56. The Defend Trade Secrets Act was passed by Congress in 2016, and does not preempt but
rather supplements the state-level protections that exist in nearly every state.
57. Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 46, at 37-38.
58. See Blake, supra note 19.
59. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information,
J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980).
60. It is a matter of some debate whether this is actually the case. Employers assert that they
will invest more and can disclose more to employees bound by non-competes, but there is little
evidence either way. Moreover, it’s not clear whether the spillover effects of being able to freely
hire employees from other firms outweigh the benefits that might accrue from having a large
number of employees bound by non-competes from changing jobs. See, e.g., Marx, Good Work,
supra note 30.
61. But see, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 30, at 970.
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As a practical matter, the anticompetitive effects for employees of
non-compete agreements can be substantial.62 Employees bound by noncompetes tend to have less bargaining power and lower wages or salaries
than those free of restriction. 63 In many cases, the restrictions can be
broad enough to keep an employee from working in his or her profession
for some period of time, leading to career detours and periods of
unemployment. 64 And for low-wage workers and employees in many
service industries, there is hardly even a pretense of an efficiency or
utilitarian justification, so the personal autonomy arguments should be
even more compelling in those contexts. In general, however, it is
unclear that there are any benefits at all to employees in being bound by
non-compete agreements.
To be fair, employers do not seek a property right in this context, so
the reference to the history of servitude may be a bit overwrought. But,
while there is a plausible incentive story to be told about human capital,
it is not a particularly powerful narrative, and the counter-narrative is
strong. The debate has largely focused on whether the evidence that a
prohibition on non-competes leads to substantially increased innovation
and economic development is powerful enough to justify such a
prohibition. The question should be asked the other way around: is there
sufficient evidence that the benefits of enforcing non-competes outweigh
the many and troubling concerns with the agreements?
C.

Defining the Scope of the Subject Matter

Assuming that it is plausible to treat human capital as a form of IP
and that some form of protection is both justified and necessary, the next
step should be defining the scope of the subject matter. All of our
intellectual property regimes define the scope and subject matter of the
IP, just as real property interests are defined by metes and bounds
descriptions.
Identifying the subject matter of the intellectual property right
serves both theoretical and evidentiary purposes. Intangibles are not
subject to metes and bounds descriptions in the way that real property is,
but the patent, copyright, and trade secret statutes aim to define the
62. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 30, at 970. See generally LOBEL, supra note 35; Cynthia
L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as
a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 379 (2006).
63. See Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive
Compensation, and Firm Investment, J.L. ECON. & ORG., Nov. 3, 2009, at 13-14, 44,
http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2009/11/03/jleo.ewp033.full.pdf+html.
64. Marx, Good Work, supra note 30.
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subject matter that they protect in other ways. Patentable, copyrightable,
and trade secret subject matter are all defined both by what they protect
and what they do not protect, and substantial portions of the case law are
occupied by this topic. This is almost certainly in part because it is
particularly difficult to describe and define an intangible thing. In
addition, the attention paid to defining the subject matter makes clear
that the intellectual property regimes are not separate silos, but instead
an interconnected system in which the subject matters of each regime
relate to the others. 65
Patent law protects “inventions”“anything under the sun made by
man” 66the precise definition of which is constantly evolving under
Supreme Court scrutiny and Congressional amendment. 67
Notwithstanding this change over time, the Patent Act has included
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.68
Moreover, the process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter
must be novel, 69 useful, 70 and nonobvious. 71 Merely from this statement,
it should be obvious that there are many, many inventions that are not
protected by the Patent Act, and this is consistent with an incentive
theory: for example, it does not promote the progress of science and
useful arts to provide exclusive rights in a non-novel invention, or an
obvious one.
Copyright law, for its part, protects “original expression,” or
creative works, 72 including literary works, musical works, and pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works. 73 Perhaps more telling than what
copyright law covers is what it does not protect. Though the bar for
originality or creativity is quite low, the exclusion of non-original works
from copyright’s subject matter is linked to the utilitarian approach.
Merely copying the work of another is not consistent with the idea of
“progress.” In other words, there is no public benefit in conferring
exclusive rights in an item that already exists in the world, and no need
to provide any incentive for its creation.
65. See generally Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 46, at 24-25.
66. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting the legislative history).
67. See, e.g., the recent series of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the subject, from Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), to Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566
U.S. 66 (2012), to Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
68. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
69. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
70. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
71. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . .”)
73. Id.
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Copyright law also excludes ideas, methods, or useful articles. 74
Those items may be patentable, or they may simply be in the public
domain, falling in between the two methods of protection. While the
creative expression in a novel or a musical composition may be
protected, a beautifully designed bicycle rack is not copyrightable.75
(And though it falls within the subject matter of patent law, it will only
receive protection if it satisfies the various hurdles the Patent Act
imposes, such as novelty, utility, and nonobviousness.) So, copyright
law does not protect useful items, and patent law only protects useful
inventions, creating a boundary—or really a territory—between the two.
Describing trade secret law by what is not protected is also a useful
exercise. As is obvious from its name, items or information that are not
secret, but are instead known or readily ascertainable, are not properly
the subject of trade secret law. 76 And again this is consistent with a
utilitarian approachallowing proprietary rights in public information is
both inefficient and consumer-unfriendly. Under our approach to
intellectual property protection, we only do such a thing under the fairly
rigorous standards of the Patent Act or the Copyright Act, and the
disclosure of the information is part of the quid pro quo by which
exclusive rights are granted. 77 Granting those rights after disclosure
would be counter-productive in efficiency terms.
Trade secret law differs from patent and copyright law in that it
defines its subject matter to a large extent by the way in which it is
treated, rather than by the form of the work. 78 Only subject matter that is
secretor at least relatively secret and subject to reasonable measures to
maintain that secrecymay be protected under the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act and under the new federal trade secrets act.79 Any “valuable
information” that falls within this definition may be protected, but again
there are some boundary principles that limit the reach of trade secret
protection. The owner of a trade secret must choose between patent
protection and continued secrecy, as the contents of a patent application
74. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery . . .”)
75. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
76. See Unif. Trade Secrets Act (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985); Defend Trade Secrets Act of
2016, Pub. L. 114-153.
77. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 210-17 (2003) (discussing the quid pro
quo entailed in the Copyright Act and, to a lesser extent, in the Patent Act).
78. Under the Unif. Trade Secrets Act, something is protected as a trade secret when it is
valuable and “is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.”
79. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-153
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will be published after eighteen months; 80 the Patent Act contemplates
that the owner or inventor discloses the information to the public in
exchange for the patent right. 81 The same is not true for copyright law;
we do not require disclosure as the price of copyright protection, but the
vast majority of expressive works are impossible to distribute and
exploit while at the same time remaining secret.82
While many intangible goods are indeed difficult to describe in
words or are problematic in terms of providing a sample or a copy for
evidentiary purposes, it is even more complicated to seek to define
“human capital” as a form of IP in a way that would provide a useful and
sufficiently cabined scope, and in a way that would help make clear its
relationship with other forms of IP. Human capital seems substantially
less capable of definition than other forms of IP. Wikipediafar from a
definitive source, but a useful place to start describes human capital as
the “stock of knowledge, habits, social, and personality attributes,
including creativity, embodied in the ability to perform labor so as to
produce economic value.” 83 The Encyclopedia of Economics, not a
definitive source either, defines human capital in a way that
differentiates it from other kinds of intangibles: “economists regard
expenditures on education, training, medical care, and so on as
investments in human capital. They are called human capital because
people cannot be separated from their knowledge, skills, health, or
values in the way they can be separated from their financial and physical
assets.” 84
Given these definitions, human capital differs in some fundamental
ways from other forms of IP. Like other kinds of IP, human capital is
intangible, and it does have some of the characteristics of nonexcludability and non-rivalrousness that other forms of public goods
have. But it is nonetheless much more difficult to conceive of human
capital as a divisible thing, and that difficulty makes the property
conception of a bundle of sticks less analogous. In other words, human
80. 35 U.S.C. § 122.
81. Note, Benjamin N. Roin, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack
Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2011-13 (2005).
82. Computer source code is a significant exception to this general rule, as it is much easier
to keep secret than most expressive works.
83. Human Capital, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_capital (last visited
Aug. 28, 2016) (stating that human capital can be described in individual or aggregate terms. “Many
theories explicitly connect investment in human capital development to education, and the role of
human capital in economic development, productivity growth, and innovation has frequently been
cited as a justification for government subsidies for education and job skills training”).
84. Human
Capital,
THE
CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
ECONOMICS,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/HumanCapital.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2016).
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capital is perhaps less capable of being circumscribed and limited in
ways that would make it possible to convey it, or portions of it, in the
same ways that other forms of intellectual property are transferred.
An employer may obtain a quasi-exclusive right in a worker’s
labor, talents, and skills during the period of employment, but this is
generally conceived of in agency and employment law terms. 85 An
employee owes duties of loyalty and care, and in some cases a fiduciary
duty, to an employer. 86 This differs substantially from a property rights
notion, and it is difficult to articulate how one would define the metes
and bounds, the subject matter, of a property-like right in human capital.
And while the output of human (employee) ingenuity—a patentable
invention or a new creative work, for example—can be understood in
discrete terms, the same is not true of human capital. The “thingness,”
which exists even with intangibles, simply is not present.
D.

What Rights are Included?

The subject matter definitions and carve-outs in patent law and
copyright law and trade secret law define the scope of the thing sought
to be protected, just as real property is defined by its metes and bounds
and personal property by its tangible “thingness.” These definitions are
critical to the rights-holder’s ability to exclude. 87 Both real property
rights and intellectual property rights consist of a “bundle of sticks.”
Once the metes and bounds of the right have been determined, the
question is what kinds of rights should be conferred on the owner. As
with real property, the core principle is a right to exclude. 88 Just as a
property owner can keep people off her parcel of property, a patent
holder can prevent others from making or selling the invention covered
by the patent and a copyright holder can enjoin copying, at least under
some circumstances. 89
Patent, copyright, and trade secret rights may be assigned or
licensed, just as real property may be sold or rented, and the rights are
divisible. The Patent Act confers a set of negative rightsto prevent
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, §1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); RESTATEMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2009); (employees breach their duty of loyalty to the
employer by competing with the employer while employed by the employer) (emphasis added).
86. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01(a).
87. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, The Thing About Exclusion, (Harvard Pub. Law, Working
Paper No. 14-26, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2449321 (“The right
to exclude is a sine qua non of debates over property”).
88. Id.
89. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (providing that courts may grant injunctions for patent infringement); 17
U.S.C. § 502 (courts may grant injunctions in copyright cases).
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others from making, using, or selling the invention 90and those rights
may be assigned or licensed in whole or in part. The owner may license,
exclusively or non-exclusively, the right to make the invention, for
example, or simply the right to prevent others from selling the invention.
In the alternative, the owner may transfer by assignment all the rights in
the patent to another person or entity.
Similarly, the copyright owner can assign all the rights in the
creative work. In the alternative, the owner may dole the rights out
individually, licensing the film rights to a production studio, the
serialization rights to a publisher, and the right to make action figures to
yet another party, for example. 91 A copyright owner has the right to
control copies of the work, the right of distribution, and the right to
control derivative works, among others. 92
The rights in patents and copyrights are property-like rights,
whereas trade secret rights are tort-like rights: a trade secret owner does
not have the right to exclude—if another person discovers and invents
the same trade secret, that owner may exploit the work—but rather has a
right against misappropriation. 93 Nonetheless, a trade secret owner may
by contract convey part or all of the rights in the trade secret.
If the core notion of an intellectual property right is the right to
exclude, that paradigm does not seem to be a good fit for thinking about
rights in human capital. It is the “thingness” of both real (and even
intellectual) property that allows for exclusion. In the context of human
capital, the analogy is complicated. Would the right to exclude with
respect to human capital mean that someone other than the person in
whom the human capital resides could exercise that right? The property
rights paradigm simply fails in this context.
Other legal regimes do present an alternative, however. As we saw
above, trade secret law takes a tort-like approach to protecting rightsowners. This is not dissimilar from the agency and employment law
principles that bind employees during the term of employment. 94 It is
settled and uncontroversial that an employee may not compete with an
employer while she is employed, 95 but this obligation does not extend
into the post-employment period. That is, employees are not prohibited
90. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (“ . . . whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention . . . infringes the patent”).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (a copyright owner has not just the right to take advantage of the rights
conferred by the act but to authorizes others to do so).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (setting forth the exclusive rights in copyrighted works).
93. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 1 (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985) (defining misappropriation).
94. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2009).
95. Id.
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by agency-like obligations from competing with a former employer.
Thus, employers have turned to contract as the way to control postemployment human capital.
In some ways, contract operates in ways that are less problematic in
the context of controlling human capital. A property right would present
thorny problems, including potential Thirteenth Amendment concerns. 96
Contracts, on the other hand, are not rights against the world, as property
rights are. In most situations, contracts are not perpetual, they require
clear terms, and, importantly here, they require voluntary agreement.
When a relevant concern is the free flow of labor, the voluntariness of an
agreement should be a compelling consideration. In other words, if an
employee willingly enters into a non-compete agreement with her
employer, should we second-guess that choice?
In fact, courts and legislatures do second-guess that choice and they
consistently treat non-compete agreements differently than most other
kinds of agreements. While the freedom of contract notion in most other
circumstances means that courts will not look into the adequacy of
exchange in an agreement, or police the terms in (hardly) any way,
nearly every state imposes much more severe restrictions on noncompete agreements, regularly examines the terms for reasonableness
and fairness, and engages in a balancing test that takes public policy into
account (much like the quid pro quo of the patent and copyright systems
takes account of the benefits that might accrue to the public).97 Noncompete agreements are flatly unenforceable in a few states—most
notably California 98—and are viewed skeptically in most other
jurisdictions. 99 Moreover, there has been a great deal of change in the
law of non-competes in the last several years, and nearly all of the court
cases and nearly all of the new legislation has moved in the direction of
increasing restrictions on non-compete enforceability. 100
As described above, courts, legislatures, and scholars have
discussed in depth whether the restrictions on non-competes might be
justified based on the implications for innovation and economic
96. See Estlund, supra note 63, at 408 (“An extremely broad waiver of the right to work
elsewhere after quitting, such as would be permitted under an ordinary contractual treatment of
[noncompete] agreements, comes very close in effect to contracting away one’s inalienable right to
quit. So the pall of the Thirteenth Amendment and its ban on involuntary servitude hangs over these
agreements.”).
97. See Moffat, Making Noncompetes Unenforceable, supra note 14, at 943-51.
98. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600.
99. One example is Colorado, in which non-competes are prohibited except under a few set
of circumstances. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113.
100. See Lohr, supra note 5.
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development. But the best way to understand the hesitation of courts and
legislatures to take a pure freedom of contract approach is that there are
real concerns regarding the voluntariness in fact of the formation of such
agreements and regarding the public policy implications of the
enforcement of those agreements. 101 In fact, this uneasiness with noncompetition agreements circles back to the problem of restricting the
free flow of labor. 102 Even if non-competes do not raise Thirteenth
Amendment issues, they harken back to a time of involuntary servitude:
the concern is precisely one of ownership of labor.
E.

Who Owns the Rights and How May They be Conveyed?

At least as important as defining the subject matter of an
intellectual property right is determining who owns the right and how it
may be transferred. Fundamental to a property right is the concept of
alienability. A thing, including an intangible thing, is more economically
valuable if it can be sold, rented, or assigned. With intellectual property,
where ownership vests initially is of particular importance so that it is
clear who may exploit or transfer the rights. 103
For a patentable invention, the rights vest in the inventor or the
inventors, but things are different if the invention arises on the job. If the
employee was “hired to invent,” the employer may own the invention
and has the right to seek patent protection 104 (The inventor will be listed
as such, but does not have ownership rights.). In some instances, the
original inventor will be the owner of the invention, but the employer
will have “shop rights,” conferring the ability to exploit the invention
along with the inventor. 105
The situation is similar, but not identical, with respect to expressive
works and copyright. An expressive work is protected under the
Copyright Act as soon as the work is “fixed in a tangible medium of
expression,” 106 and the creator is the presumptive owner. 107 Under the
101. I will not delve into the voluntariness question here, but suffice it to say that many noncompete agreements are most often form agreements, entered into after the employee has already
bargained regarding the position and often presented only after the employee has started work. See,
e.g., Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, supra note 30, at 980.
102. See Estlund, supra note 63.
103. The classic discussion of alienability (and inalienability) in property law (and tort law) is
Guido Calabresi and Doulas Melamed’s article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
104. See William P. Hovell, Patent Ownership: An Employer’s Rights to His Employee’s
Inventions, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863 (1983).
105. Id.
106. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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work-made-for-hire doctrine, however, the copyright rights vest in the
hiring party when the work is created by an employee acting within the
scope of her employment or, for certain categories of works, when there
is an agreement to the effect that the hiring party is the owner. 108
These doctrines provide a fairly high degree of certainty about who
owns an inventive or creative work and, therefore, who may exploit—by
sale, by license, by development—the work, a characteristic that is
fundamental to the property-like nature of intellectual property. There
can be no market for an item, even—or perhaps especially—an
intangible item, in the absence of well-defined subject matter and ability
to exchange that subject matter. Alienability is crucial.
It is this question of alienability that is so difficult in the context of
human capital. To the extent that a non-compete has the effect of
seeking to control human capital, it is an effort at alienation of a portion
of the labor, knowledge, and skills of an individual person. It is, like
many transfers of rights, a limited one: most non-compete agreements
limit the ability of a worker to work for competitors of the employer,
often in a particular geographic region for a specific, limited, period of
time.
Even this limited transfer of rights raises serious concerns,
however. For employees in the high-tech world, or those in other
knowledge-intensive industries (and even for those in low-tech
positions), a non-compete agreement can mean the inability to work in
one’s chosen profession, in many cases foreclosing meaningful
alternative employment entirely. The fact that so many states take such a
hard look at non-competes indicates that these public policy
considerations are significant.
It should be noted that some states have taken the position that
human capital is simply inalienable – that non-compete agreements are
unenforceable. While this might seem surprising from a contracts
perspective, when it is viewed in terms of the alienation of human
capital it is much less surprising. And viewed this way, the analogy to
intellectual property appears to be particularly inappropriate.
F.

How Long Does Protection Last?

Unlike real property, which can be owned in perpetuity, the
copyright and patent terms are time-limited. The Constitution requires
107. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the
author or authors of the work.”).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “works made for hire”).
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that such rights are to be granted to owners and inventors for “Limited
Times” only. 109 The Patent Act provides for a term of protection of
twenty years from the application date; 110 the Copyright term is much
longer: life of the author plus an additional seventy years. 111 Trade
secrets are not governed by the Intellectual Property clause and can last
in perpetuity, but only so long as they remain secret. 112 As a practical
matter, the majority of trade secrets enter the public domain at some
point.
This fundamental characteristic of intellectual property sets it apart
from real property. For both, alienability is crucial, but the calculation
regarding the necessity of perpetual rights is different. For intellectual
property, the public benefit of a growing public domain is deemed to
outweigh the benefits that might accrue to owners in perpetuity.
This is not a significant problem with respect to human capital in
that even the most egregious non-competes tend to be limited in terms of
temporal scope. And certainly a one- or two-year restriction is less
problematic than a ten-year limit, or an indefinite one. This is hardly a
saving grace, however. Given the personal autonomy and dignitary
concerns presented by non-compete agreements, even short periods of
restriction are problematic. In many cases, the affected employee may be
unable to work in her chosen field or in the location where she resides
for some significant period of time. The implications of this will vary
from person to person and from field to field, but the basic problem
remains: non-compete restrictions impose serious and real burdens on
employees and their “limited” nature and terms does not change that
fact.
G.

Are There Boundary Principles? How do the Different Forms of IP
Relate to Each Other?

A final, crucial, piece of the way in which the intellectual property
system works is as exactly that—a system. To a large extent, copyright,
patent, and trade secret rights are defined in ways that acknowledge the
interaction between the three; each of those regimes has doctrines that
work to define the boundaries between the systems; and those doctrines
work to keep each regime somewhat, though not completely, separate

109.
110.
111.
112.

U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 154.
17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
1-6 Taxation of Intellectual Property § 6.15 (2016).
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from the others. 113 The channeling doctrines, as they are called, place
patent law at the center—or perhaps at the top—of the system, and they
focus on ensuring that items that are or might be patentable do not
receive another form of protection instead of or in addition to patent
protection. 114
With respect to the boundary between patent law and copyright
law, copyright’s useful article doctrine attempts to draw a bright line
between the two fields of protection. Patent law covers only useful
inventions, 115 and the useful article doctrine in copyright law provides
that “useful” items or any useful aspect of a creative work may not be
protected under copyright law. 116 Although determining what constitutes
a useful article in the context of industrial design or fashion, for
example, is a far from easy task in practice, the principle—and the
policy behind that principle—is clear. 117 Patent law involves a clear
trade-off: a very strong set of rights, but with a limited term, so that
useful inventions are released to the public within a reasonable time. If
an inventor can get a monopoly-form of protection, even if it is the
weaker form of copyright law, for a substantially longer period of time
and with virtually no examination, the public is not likely to get its end
of the bargain. In other words, copyright’s useful article doctrine seeks
to prevent the run-aroundthe avoidance of the relatively rigorous
patent review process and the relatively short term of protectionthat
might otherwise occur. 118
There is also a dividing line between trade secret law and patent
119
law. Some inventions are capable of remaining “secret” even if they
113. This is also true of the trademark regime, and there are channeling principles that create a
dividing line between trademark law and patent law, and between trademark law and copyright law.
114. Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
873 (2009).
115. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (utility).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[T]he design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”).
117. See Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 611 (2014)
(discussing the policy reasons underlying the useful article doctrine).
118. Trademark law has a similar doctrine—functionality—that serves the same purpose.
Although trademark law does not provide the same broad, property-like kind of protection that
patent and copyright do, the functionality doctrine nonetheless serves to channel “functional” works
away from trademark protection. As with the copyright’s useful article doctrine, functional items
may not receive trademark protection; this does not mean that they will necessarily be protected by
patent law. Thus, a variety of “useful” and “functional” items will be free to the public for copying,
unless they are protected in some other way.
119. The line between copyright law and trade secret law is not such a bright one.
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are sold on the marketthe formula for Coca-Cola being perhaps the
most famous examplewhile others are simply incapable of being
secret once they are released to the public. A revolutionary mousetrap,
for example, is likely to be easily reverse-engineered once it is available.
In either case, though, if the inventor or owner chooses to patent the
once-secret invention, the details must be disclosed to the Patent &
Trademark Office, and then to the public within eighteen months of the
patent application. 120 An inventor or the owner of valuable information
thus must make an election between trade secret protection and patent
protection in those cases where both might apply.
The analogy of human capital to intellectual property also is inapt
when we consider the idea that the intellectual property regimes are part
of a broader system for protection of intangible assets. It simply does not
make sense to think about human capital in the same terms that we think
about a patentable invention or a copyrightable work, primarily because
those things are the products of human ingenuity, of human capital itself.
To conceive of human capital as another form of IP does not just blur the
lines between the other forms of intellectual property but turns the
notion on its head.
III. CONCLUSION
In effect, non-competes provide a partial form of new protection for
intangible human creation and invention. While they are often justified
on the basis that they are necessary to more fully protect trade secrets,
and in that way they operate as a kind of meta-trade secret protection,
they also operate much more broadly than that, seeking to control
substantially more than the employer’s trade secrets. By limiting the
employment possibilities for employees, non-competes seek to control
not only the output of human ingenuity and creativity, but also the
source of itthe human capital itself.
Taking employers’ arguments seriously and evaluating noncompetes and the way that non-competes control human capital, as an
effort to create and control a new form of intellectual property, reveals
that the IP justification for non-competes is not sustainable. It simply
Copyrightable works may be submitted in redacted form—a software designer can keep secret
portions of the code and still receive copyright protection, for example. As a practical matter,
however, most expressive works—with the (significant) exception of computer code—are difficult
to exploit in the marketplace while remaining secret. A novel cannot be read by millions and be a
secret; a musical composition is apparent to the ear of every listener. By their very subject matter,
then, copyright and trade secret subject matter do not overlap significantly, except for code.
120. See 35 U.S.C. § 122.
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falls apart upon close examination and would be unworkable (and
possibly unconstitutional) if it were made explicit.
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Appendix A
Recent Legislative Action
See: Alabama (HB 352)—revised its general prohibition to include
more detail about what is permitted.
Arkansas (Act 921)—added a new section allowing non-competes
with many specifications.
Connecticut (SB 00351)—prohibits non-competes for physicians.
Hawaii (HB 1090/Act 158)—prohibits non-competes in the tech
industry. A bill prohibiting them in the health care industry was deferred
indefinitely in February.
Idaho (HB487)—amended statute to create rebuttable presumption
of irreparable harm if “key employee” breaches non-compete agreement.
Illinois (SB3163)—”Freedom to Work Act” prohibits noncompetes for low-wage employees.
Nebraska (LB942)—requires disclosure of existing non-compete
agreements in transactions for sales of businesses.
New Hampshire (NH Rev Stat 275.70)—added a section effective
in July 2014 requiring an employer to provide a copy of the noncompete agreement before an employee accepts an offer of employment.
New Mexico (SB0325)—prohibits non-competes for health-care
practitioners.
Oregon (2015 ORS 653.295)—reduces reasonable time from two
years to eighteen months. Oregon’s major revisions were in 2008,
effective in 2009. The bill this year made only this amendment.
Rhode Island (H7586)—prohibits non-competes for physicians.
Utah (HB0251)—”Post-Employment Restrictions Act” limits noncompete agreements entered into after May 10, 2016 to a period of one
year.
Bills that were introduced but have not been enacted
Maryland (HB 506)—would prohibit non-compete agreements.
Received an “unfavorable committee report” in March and went no
further.
Maryland, Michigan, and New York all had bills prohibiting noncompete agreements for low-wage workers. The bills in Michigan and
Maryland did not pass but the NY bill went to the Senate Rules
Committee in June.
Massachusetts came close to passing a law imposing restrictions
on non-compete agreements (this was the ninth attempt,) but the
competing House and Senate versions died in a conference committee on
July 31, the last day of the legislative session. Below are summaries of
the two bills and the texts are attached:
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https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2016/07/11/massachusettsnoncompete-bill-enhanced-by-senate/ (highlights of Senate bill).
https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2016/07/15/lining-up-themassachusetts-senate-and-house-noncompete-utsa-bills/ (comparison of
House and Senate bills).
https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2016/08/01/massachusettsnoncompete-law-stalls/ (bill died as of July 31, end of legislative
session).
Michigan (HB4198)—would change “employer” to “a purchaser of
business goodwill or a business interest” and “employee” to “owner,
principal or officer of the seller’s business” in the existing statute that
permits non-compete agreements, and would add some additional
conditions for them to be enforceable. It was referred to a committee in
February.
New York (see this link: http://tinyurl.com/npt3zpm)—would
prohibit non-compete agreements as a restraint of trade. Numerous bills
with identical language were introduced earlier this year and all were
referred to committee.
Pennsylvania (HB336)—would prohibit for health-care
practitioners. Referred to committee in February.
Washington (HB1577)—specifies when non-compete is prohibited
and conditions for enforceability. Appears to be still pending.
Wisconsin (SB69)—would repeal current law regarding noncompetes and create “restrictive covenants” enforceable under certain
conditions. Referred to committee in March.
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